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Abstract
In open and distributed property-based access control systems, access rights are granted because of presented
certiﬁed properties. However, controlling agents base their access decisions not only on presented certiﬁed
properties. Crucial factors are the correlations between certiﬁed properties, experiences and expectations
concerning other participating agents, and the resulting trust modalities. This work identiﬁes the essential
correlations and demonstrates how they can be explicitly integrated in access decisions.
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1 Introduction
Open and distributed IT-systems require elaborate and dynamic ways to enforce ac-
cess control. As we focus on distributed systems with autonomously acting agents,
traditional global or hierarchical access control systems are not suitable. In such
distributed IT-systems, each agent controlling a resource needs to discretionarily
and dynamically maintain and enforce the resource’s access control policy. Fur-
thermore, requesting agents are usually not identiﬁed or registered. For such a
setting, attribute-based access control models are well suited, see e.g. [1,4,12,13,16].
In this work, we prefer using the term property-based access control model, which
originates from a later on introduced important distinction between diﬀerent types
of a requesting agent’s property. Thus, each controlling agent states his resource’s
access control policy in terms of properties that are required for accessing the cor-
responding resource.
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There exist two main issues that need to be considered in property-based access
control systems. First, a controlling agent need to be aware of the “property scheme”
which is used by a certifying agent. Otherwise properties that are encoded in
submitted certiﬁcates do not necessarily match those requested by the corresponding
access control policy. Second, existing approaches for property-based access control
systems are usually monotonic in the sense that more certiﬁed properties imply
more positive access decisions.
To face the ﬁrst issue, we deploy a comprehensive view of trust. Instead of
assuming a global property scheme, controlling agents decide on the trustworthiness
concerning certifying agents. As earlier proposed in [15], each access control policy
reﬂects (local) trust modalities of the respective controlling agent. It turns out
that local trust modalities are determined by diﬀerent local and global aspects of
the underlying system. To face the second issue, our model considers revocation of
already certiﬁed properties, explicit access prohibitions and statements about trust
and distrust concerning other agents.
We conceptually develop the fundamentals in Section 2 by analysing the cor-
relation of agents’ properties, expectations and resulting trust modalities with re-
spect to decisions on property conversion and (direct) access requests. We suggest
credential-based implementation ideas in Section 3. In Section 4 we identify so-
called structures that our model consists of: the issuing structure, the forwarding
structure and the trust structures. In Section 5 we give an example for deﬁning
security policy rules, and we conclude in Section 6.
2 The Trust- and Property-based Fundamentals
Hereafter, we use the terms free and bound property as introduced in [3]. Assigning
participants certify free properties without any further intention on their usage:
Free properties are independent of any resource or access decision. They can have
positive, negative, or neutral inﬂuences on access decisions of a controlling agent.
A resource’s owner certiﬁes bound properties in terms of a speciﬁc resource: Bound
properties are regarded as permissions to use the resource. For getting a bound
property, a requester has to present requested free properties. The granting of
a bound property caused by the veriﬁcation of presented free properties is called
property conversion. For direct access, a requester has to present the corresponding
bound property to the controlling participant.
It is important to note that this distinction relates to an owner-speciﬁc view.
Bound properties that are granted within an owner’s domain may be regarded as
free properties within another owner’s domain.
Considering a monotonic access control system, an owner can express only trust
in other participants: He trusts certain assigning participants to correctly assign free
properties, and he trusts the holders of these certiﬁed free properties to harmlessly
access his resource. However, such a monotonic access control system is too re-
strictive. In simple non-monotonic access control systems, access rights are granted
because of decisions that base on positive experiences and expectations, whereas
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negative experiences and expectations lead to removing existing access rights.
We speciﬁcally argue for dealing with doubt and distrust as well. Therefore,
we extend the meaning of bound properties as follows. Trust on the side of an
owner leads to granting a bound property that is regarded as a positive access
right. Distrust leads to granting a bound property that is regarded as a negative
access right. Thus, distrust does not lead to removing a granted positive access
right. Whenever an owner has doubts on a granted bound property, he removes it.
2.1 Deﬁnitions of Knowledge and Local Evaluation
First, we deﬁne trust modalities in the form of relationships between two partic-
ipants of the computing environment. As we focus on an access control system,
we consider how the owner’s trust modalities are determined and further how they
inﬂuence his decisions on property conversion. The owner trusts, distrusts or has
doubts on assigners, he is aware of, concerning their tasks. This means that an
owner can take on several trust modalities concerning one assigner, namely one
trust modality concerning each property that is certiﬁed or is announced to be cer-
tiﬁed by the respective assigner. The owner’s trust modalities inﬂuence his decisions
on property conversion by being used in his security policy as shown in Section 5
with an example. There is a growing variety of meanings of trust (modalities), see
e.g., [11,6,13,8]. As a minimal agreement, trust might be deﬁned as “a ﬁrm belief
in the competence of an entity to act dependably, [. . .], within a speciﬁed context”
[8]. We want to explore the origin of belief and add distrust and doubt. Therefore,
we deﬁne the trust modalities on the basis of a participant’s knowledge.
Let sets A and P be given that denote the participating agents and properties,
respectively. The global knowledge K is deﬁned as K ⊂ A×P. The global knowledge
is the set of grantor-property pairs
(i) that deal with free or bound properties that are actually certiﬁed by the re-
spective granting participant, or
(ii) for which the stated granting participant has publicly announced that he will
certify the respective property.
As trust modalities always refer to a particular participant, we deﬁne the local
knowledge Ka of participant a as Ka ⊆ K. This means that the local knowledge Ka
of a participant a ∈ A is the collection of all grantor-property pairs that the partici-
pant is aware of 5 . For determining his trust modalities, each participant evaluates
his local knowledge restricted to those grantor-property pairs that deal with free
properties from his speciﬁc view. By abuse of language, we hereafter identify the lo-
cal knowledge Ka of participant a with the set of grantor-property pairs containing
free properties from the participant-speciﬁc view. Then, Ka is evaluated by a local
function evala that maps a grantor-property pair (ai, pi) with ai ∈ A, pi ∈ P to a
trust modality t ∈ T with T := {TRUST,DOUBT,DISTRUST}. Thus, the local
evaluation function evala of participant a is deﬁned as evala : Ka → T . The eval-
5 The meaning of being aware of is explained in Section 4.
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uation is determined by expectations of the corresponding participant a as follows.
If the participant expects that for a given grantor-property pair (ai, pi) assigner
ai honestly certiﬁes or will honestly certify property pi, then a positive evaluation
maps the grantor-property pair to trust, i.e. , evala(ai, pi) = TRUST . Analogously,
a negative evaluation maps a given grantor-property pair to distrust, and a neutral
evaluation maps a given grantor-property pair to doubt. Obviously, the local eval-
uation function leads to the disjoint classiﬁcation sets KTRUSTa , K
DISTRUST
a , and
KDOUBTa with
Ka = K
TRUST
a ∪˙ K
DISTRUST
a ∪˙ K
DOUBT
a .
The classiﬁcation sets represent the participant’s trust modalities.
2.2 Expansion of Local Knowledge and Refreshed Expectations
Any new participant of the computing environment starts with initial experiences
coming from outside the system. Caused by his experiences, the participant forms
his expectations concerning the believed behaviour of other participants. Then,
the participant evaluates his local knowledge as introduced above and gains the
classiﬁcation sets. Any new grantor-property pair the participant gets informed of
leads to an expansion of his local knowledge 6 . We consider two cases:
(i) A “redundant” expansion of local knowledge occurs, if the owner gets informed
about a grantor-property pair that is already mapped to one of his classiﬁca-
tion sets. The current evaluation of his local knowledge already considers the
grantor-property pair and no new evaluation of his local knowledge is necessary.
(ii) An “eﬀective” expansion of local knowledge occurs, if the owner gets informed
about a so far unknown grantor-property pair. In this case, a new evaluation
of the now enlarged local knowledge is necessary. The classiﬁcation sets remain
unaltered, except for the new mapping of the grantor-property pair.
Refreshed expectations are caused by the owner’s experiences, e.g. , when a re-
quester acts against the owner’s expectations. In this case, the owner’s experiences
change. Consequently, he refreshes his expectations and the local evaluation is
reperformed. This might lead to an alteration of the classiﬁcation sets.
3 A Certiﬁcate- and Credential-based Implementation
For certifying properties it is common practice to use certiﬁcates. The most well-
known public key infrastructures include X.509 [9] and SPKI/SDSI [7]. Following
[3], we use the terms certiﬁcates and credentials as follows: Certiﬁcates are used to
certify free properties whereas credentials are used to certify bound properties. Fur-
ther, we postulate that for each property p ∈ P there exists an “opposite property”
p ∈ P.
We consider two kinds of access requests to a particular resource:
6 How a participant gets informed of new grantor-property pairs is described in Section 4.
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(i) The requester suitably presents collected attribute certiﬁcates in order to gain
a speciﬁc authorisation credential. Based on his security policy rules, the owner
decides on the request for property conversion. In the case that the owner will
grant a bound property, we distinguish between a successful and an unsuc-
cessful property conversion. The distinction depends on whether the bound
property is regarded as a positive access right or as a negative access right,
respectively. A successful property conversion is materialized by issuing an au-
thorisation credential, and an unsuccessful property conversion is materialized
by issuing a prohibition credential. In the case that the owner’s veriﬁcation of
the presented attribute certiﬁcates fails, his decision leads to a failed property
conversion: The request is rejected and no credential is issued.
(ii) The requester presents an authorisation credential for the respective resource
by submitting a collected authorisation credential or by immediately presenting
the result of a successful property conversion. Thus, no property conversion is
necessary for a direct access request. The owner decides on the (direct) access
request by simply verifying the presented authorisation credential.
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prohibition credential revocation
authorisation credential
priorizes at 
decision time 
relates to 
trust modality
at issuing time:
distrust
trust
doubt
 Credential Priorities
credential
credential
revocation
attribute certificate
 Certificate Priorities
certificate
Fig. 1. Certiﬁcate and Credential Priorities at Decision Time
Summarizing, Figure 1 depicts the priorities of certiﬁcates and credentials, as-
suming the owner is aware of them at decision time. For placing conﬁdentiality
and integrity over availability of the resource, we priorize a prohibition credential
over the corresponding authorisation credential. The declared priorities should be
considered as defaults; in special situations diﬀerent priorities might be reasonable.
We stress that we do not postulate the use of a particular public key infrastruc-
ture. An emerging query-and-response protocol standard for exchanging authori-
sation and authentication information is SAML [5]. Depending on the underlying
infrastructure one can also employ the SAML protocol for exchanging participants’
properties. Considering our scenario, the most relevant SAML statements are at-
tribute assertions by which an assertion subject is associated with stated attributes.
SAML attribute assertions may be used as input to authorisation decisions made
according to the XACML standard [14]. Among an authorisation architecture pro-
posal, XACML deﬁnes an XML-dialect for specifying attribute-based access control
policies. In case of using XACML policies, the exchange of requested properties can
be done via both certiﬁcates/credentials and SAML.
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4 Structures of the Model
The presented conceptual model bases on three essential structures: (1) The issu-
ing structure, (2) the information forwarding structure, and (3) the trust structures.
Each structure encloses diﬀerent aspects that are produced due to participants’
tasks or other actions such as announcing grantor-property pairs or evaluating lo-
cal knowledge. The issuing structure and the information forwarding structure are
global structures, because the enclosed aspects are produced by the tasks and ac-
tions of all participants of the computing environment. Even so, the information
forwarding structure produces local aspects for particular participants. Further,
each participant maintains a completely local structure, namely his own trust struc-
ture. The structures are cyclicly dependent from each other as visualized in Figure 2.
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Fig. 2. Cycle of the Structures
The issuing structure, depicted at the top of the cycle, encloses the set C of all is-
sued certiﬁcates and credentials and the global knowledge K. The global knowledge
is produced by extracting the grantor-property pairs from each attribute certiﬁcate
and authorisation credential in C and by assigners’ announcements. Assigners may
publicly announce that they will issue particular grantor-property pairs.
The information forwarding structure encloses the local knowledge Ka of each
participant a and the local set of certiﬁcates Cfa and the local set of credentials
Cba the participant a is aware of. These aspects are produced by communicating
actions of the participants. Each participant is aware of credentials and certiﬁcates
he has issued and additionally of those granted to him. The local knowledge of a
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participant is produced by extracting the grantor-property pairs from each attribute
certiﬁcate in the local set of certiﬁcates and additionally by other communicating
actions such as getting informed of public announcements.
As introduced in Section 2, each participant determines his trust modalities
by evaluating his local knowledge about grantor-property pairs that deal with free
properties. The local evaluation depends on the participant’s (initial or refreshed)
expectations. Each local trust structurea encloses the classiﬁcation sets of the re-
spective participant a. A refreshed experience may lead to an alteration of the
classiﬁcation sets. Depending on already issued credentials and the security policy
rules, the altered classiﬁcation sets may cause the issuing of revocation credentials.
The enclosed security policy rules are administrated by the respective partici-
pant a. Initiated by a request action, participant a decides on property conversion
depending on the classiﬁcation sets, the security policy rules and the local set of
certiﬁcates Cfa . Decisions on property conversion inﬂuence the issuing structure
as follows: For each (successful and unsuccessful) property conversion, participant
a issues a corresponding authorisation or prohibition credential. It is possible to
immediately decide on a (direct) access request after a (un)successful property con-
version.
5 An Example for Security Policy Rules
An owner may explicitly deﬁne security policy rules in order to take decisions on
property conversion. Here, we exemplarily sketch a simple security policy speciﬁ-
cation language that can be easily integrated in logic-based frameworks for ﬂexible
authorization mechanisms like, e.g., [2,10]. Our ﬁrst-order logic language uses the
following vocabulary: constants for resources, participating agents, and properties,
and variables for participating agents and properties; the predicate symbols trust,
doubt, and distrust for classiﬁcation sets, and the predicate symbol cert for
certiﬁed free properties; the predicate symbols suc and unsuc for successful and
unsuccessful property conversions, respectively. Further, Boolean connectives and
the common quantiﬁers are used. A security policy rule is a rule of one of the
forms: (1) suc(r, a) ← E(L1, . . . , Ln) or (2) unsuc(r, a) ← E(L1, . . . , Ln), where
r denotes a resource, a denotes the requesting agent, L1, . . . , Ln are trust modality
literals (i.e., built from trust, distrust, or doubt) or cert literals (i.e., built from
cert), and E designates the syntactic structure of the employed connectives and
quantiﬁers, where some suitable restrictions might apply.
We show a simple example for security policy rules and thereby give an infor-
mal semantics for the security policy speciﬁcation language. Roughly speaking, we
evaluate the truth values of trust modality literals with respect to the owner’s local
classiﬁcation sets, and the truth values of cert literals with respect to the owner’s
local certiﬁcate set. Note that we here do not consider conﬂict resolution.
suc(file2,a2)← ∃a1 (cert(a1,Diploma,a2) ∧ ¬distrust(a1,Diploma))
This rule derives a successful property conversion for a requesting participant
a2 concerning the bound property accessing file2, iﬀ
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• there exists a valid attribute certiﬁcate in Cfo that binds the free property Diploma
to the requesting participant a2, whereby
• the issuer a1 of this attribute certiﬁcate and the free property Diploma must not
be a distrusted grantor-property pair, i.e., the grantor-property pair must not be
member of the owner’s classiﬁcation set KDISTRUSTo .
6 Conclusion
Requesting resources in identity-less and distributed access control systems with
autonomously acting agents requires that requesting agents present (sets of) certiﬁed
properties in order to gain authorised accesses to the resources. Controlling agents
base their access decisions not only on the presented certiﬁed properties, but rather
on the correlation between certiﬁed properties and own expectations regarding both
issuing and requesting agents. To address this problem, we have proposed a simple
trust- and property-based access control model. The contribution of our paper lies
in the identiﬁed correlations of certiﬁed properties, experiences and expectations
of controlling agents, and resulting trust modalities with respect to decisions on
property conversion and (direct) access requests. The work in this paper is still
in progress. Examples of open issues include the examination of the proposed
credentials/certiﬁcates types regarding their actual implementation. Further, our
ongoing work explores elaborating the security policy speciﬁcation language.
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